Will We Not Survive Ourselves?

 "We crossed the oceans wide, built cities to the sky oh lord. Looked up and we were flying. But will we not survive ourselves?" - Dave Matthew Band, Gaucho

This lyric stuck in my head over the last week as I read numerous think pieces regarding President Trump and his need to either A) resign the Presidency, B) have his powers removed by his Cabinet and Vice President via the 25th Amendment, or C) be Impeached and tried. I am not going to write thousands of words on this (although I could), but I did want to jump on to lay out a few points about why it is important to have a check on Presidential power, and the significant risk we find ourselves in as a country and civilization.

I suspect most people have never heard of James Schlesinger. He was the Secretary of Defense under President Nixon, a man who took an action that can simultaneously be celebrated and condemned - and neither side would be wrong. In 1974 President Nixon was nearing resignation, and was, by all accounts, not well mentally. He was drinking to excess, and scheming ways to stay in power. He was even reported to have joked about dropping a nuclear bomb on Capitol Hill as Congress moved to impeach him. This nuclear fantasy wasn't isolated; he also is reported to have made a point of saying "I can go into my office and pick up the telephone, and in 25 minutes 70 million people will be dead."  

Secretary Schlesinger helped to make that not possible, as he separated the nuclear codes from President Nixon, further insisting that any order to launch be cleared by him or National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger first. Many of the things that led to Secretary Schlesinger's unprecedented action in 1974 are present today: a damaged, mentally unwell President scheming for ways to stay in power, desperate and fearing for his own legal liability. Secretary Schlesinger acted in a way that could accurately be described as simultaneously patriotic and mutinous. He acted to save the world, while also undermining the chain of command to his Commander in Chief. This article, entitled "The Most Patriotic Act of Treason in American History" sums it up well, just in the title. (If you're interested in learning more about this period of time, including Nixon, the nuclear codes, and the relevance to this discussion today, check out this article.)

There is no doubt in my mind that President Trump hoped that the violent insurrection on January 6th, 2021 would lead to him staying in power. Foreign policy experts like Fiona Hill and Timothy Snyder have given detailed explanations about why this was, in fact, a coup attempt, and how Trump's actions closely align with failed dictators, but didn't deviate too far from those of successful dictators. I won't rehash their well researched, well reasoned articles here. I will strongly encourage you to read them for context to this entire discussion. Those who would say that President Trump didn't attempt a coup, didn't attempt to move us towards an authoritarian dictatorship, and didn't directly seek to undermine democracy in our country are simply lying: either to themselves, or to you. He did, and in that context, we need to revisit Secretary Schlesinger's actions in the context of 2021 and beyond. 

Joe Cirincione is one of the leading minds in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. His book, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats was a key resources in my education in international relations. The book opens with this statement:

"The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is widely recognized as the most serious threat to the national security of the United States and other nations." 

In the 15 plus years since the second edition of this book was published, the only thing that I would add is that climate change has probably wedged itself in there on equal footing. That said, the nuclear age undoubtedly brought challenges, and we face those challenges still today. Cirincione is one of the most established and respected minds in foreign policy when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security/diplomacy, and weapons systems (including their realistic use and limitations). He writes for Responsible Statecraft these days, and it is his most recent article, from January 13, 2021, that I want to end by reflecting on. 

Cirincione opens by reflecting on Speaker Pelosi's concerns about President Trump, in his closing days, being unfit to have nuclear launch capability at his disposal. Of course, if you followed the news you know that Speaker Pelosi says she was assured by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Milley, that there were checks in place to stop the President from acting on any impulse to start a war (most likely, Cirincinoe correctly points out, with Iran; my concerns here could fill another post). Of course, if General Milley or any other military member ignored the President's direct order, they would be violating their chain of command, which would be mutiny.

Cirincione explains, in readily accessible detail, the reason that the system is set up as it is (for the President to be able to authorize a nuclear strike by himself without secondary approval). Cirincione also explains why that needs to change, and then suggests how to do it: 

"It must be at the top of Joe Biden's agenda to change the obsolete policies that make this nightmare scenario possible. One, end the first-strike policy so that any order to fire nuclear weapons first is illegal. Two, take weapons off high alert so that they cannot be launched in minutes, allowing more time for deliberation and reconsideration of launch orders. Three, end the sole authority of any president to start a nuclear way by requiring at the top what we require all the rest of the way down the launch chain: two must agree to launch." 

This makes good sense. If nuclear weapons are to be a meaningful deterrent (and I am of the mindset that they are), then we should make it clear they are a deterrent, not a first strike option. This would not limit our ability, as a nation, to defend ourselves, nor would it limit our ability to respond to nuclear aggression in kind. It would simply reduce the likelihood of a desperate or unwell politician at the top of the launch command making a mistake for which all of civilization will pay. 

Of particular note, Cirincione ends by explaining that many of these actions Biden can take immediately upon taking office, through executive orders. Other actions, such as treaties for arms reduction both alone and in concert with other nations, require Congressional approval. But it is long past time for us to stop celebrating what Secretary Schlesinger did, to stop putting our hope in what General Milley says he would do, and instead recognize that putting our military or civilian servants in the position of having to engage in a mutinous action to save the world is unacceptable. 

This week has shown that these actions are all the more important, given the extreme polarization in our country that makes it so A) the President won't resign because there isn't a critical mass of Republicans calling for it, B) the Cabinet and Vice President won't act because they see it as giving in to the other side, and C) the Senate might convict, or it might not, but they won't act quickly in any event. Our political polarization has led us to a moment where most Americans, and even most in Congress, are in agreement that the President is too unsafe to have a Twitter account, but we cannot act uniformly to remove him from the nuclear codes without banking on someone engaging in mutiny to do it. That's dumb policy, and it has to change.